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This chapter has two interlinked aims. First, it presents an analysis of 
political obstacles to democratic control and reform of the finance sector 
that caused the financial crisis of 2007-8; a crisis that, after extreme 
intervention to save banks and support markets, has now become a fiscal 
crisis of the state. Second, it resumes the argument about the role of 
‘ideology’ within the socio-political process and takes a position on 
issues increasingly discussed in the social sciences under the rubric of 
performativity or how discourses format the world. The two themes come 
together in our argument about how elite power has worked politically to 
frustrate post crisis reform in the British case through mystification, as 
constitutional and economic story telling has narrowed debate and 
participation in ways that promote regulatory closure and safeguard the 
status quo. But such mystification works by mobilising narratives which 
are fragile and contestable so that outcomes, in terms of reform, are open 
and uncertain.  
 
Our empirical material is drawn from the UK, and is mostly concerned 
with the first phase of response to the crisis, which culminated in the anti 
climax of the British government’s White Paper of July 2009 – a 
document that avoided major reform of banking and finance. But we also 
show below that, while the White Paper eventually resulted in the timid 
and limited reforms of the Banking Act of 2010, it did not entirely 
succeed in closing off debate. On the contrary, it opened a new, and 
continuing, phase of struggle for reform initially led by dissenting elite 
technocrats. Our argument below is illustrated with UK evidence and our 
aim is to provide an analysis of national peculiarities, but the issues raised 
are relevant to other jurisdictions (national and supra national). We hope 
to raise broad questions about the mechanisms of elite power in present 
day capitalism where the importance of narrative has intensified since 
Reagan and Thatcher. We also aim to encourage reflection on how 
narrative power could be challenged so as to deliver a more democratic 
reform of finance.  
 
 2 
 
From opportunity lost to capitalism’s narrative turn  
  
In Britain and elsewhere, the financial crisis presents many puzzles and 
the biggest puzzle concerns the gap between the potential opportunity for 
radical change presented by the crisis and the timid reforms (so far) 
enacted. In this section we explore this puzzle and set it in the context of 
an argument about how capitalism’s narrative turn after the 1970s has 
strengthened elite power.  
 
The combination of the greatest banking and financial market crisis since 
before 1914 with unprecedented government rescue and intervention was 
immediately demystifying. In Britain, as elsewhere, it discredited the 
economic grand narrative of Bernanke and others about the ‘Great 
Moderation’ – a narrative about how capitalism had discovered a durable 
combination of growth, low inflation and low unemployment. In 
retrospect, this ‘Moderation’ was a credit led, asset price bubble inflated 
by shadow banking. This discovery immediately raised questions about 
whether finance was a pro cyclical destabilizing activity and created an 
opening for radical critique which argued that UK finance had fed a 
transaction economy rather than supported sustainable circuits of material 
transformation. 1 More broadly, the  ‘crisis moment’ in Britain – from the 
2007 failure of Northern Rock to the post Lehman systemic crisis of  
autumn 2008 – was  a demystifying moment, when finance sector alibis, 
technocratic expertise and the assumptions of the political classes were 
tested and found wanting under pressure of unanticipated events.  
 
It was also a brief ‘might have been’ democratic moment: when elected 
politicians, in both the executive and in Parliament, saw City interests 
disadvantaged, and when wider popular forces could have seriously 
challenged financial elites. Yet the outcome, at least for the moment, has 
failed entirely to match this opportunity.  The banking rescue of 2007-8 
amounted to the socialization of banking losses at a cost to the UK 
taxpayer of up to £1,000 billion (or more if we include contingent 
liabilities and exclude quantitative easing).2 British taxpayers got very 
little in return. The challenge of a brief democratic moment was met by 
the restatement of old pre crisis narratives about the importance of 
‘flexible’, market responsive regulation, and about the social value of 
finance. Familiar tropes and memes like shareholder value were 
redeployed to neutralise intervention such as the part nationalisation of 
the banking system: public ownership, as we show below, was defined as 
an interim arrangement driven by private sector imperatives.  
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All this narrowed the social definition of banking problems and solutions, 
while it also closed or discouraged discussion of how the behaviours and 
structures that failed were embedded in mainstream banking business 
models. As Engelen et al. argue, the financial structures that failed were 
not a  ‘system’ but bricolage of long, fragile chains which were smart at 
the money making links but dumb through the chains about the 
consequences of values or behaviours which were certain to change over 
the conjuncture.3 The bricoleurs of investment banking were incentivised 
by the ‘comp ratio’ business model which made wholesale banking a 
lucrative joint venture between shareholders and the senior workforce. 
The ‘comp ratio’ convention meant that the senior workforce expected a 
fixed share of turnover which they could then increase at will when the 
financial innovation of derivatives allowed the tiering of transactions. 
 
If financial bricolage and banking business models survive unreformed, 
why be surprised and why conceive of the outcome as a puzzle?  While 
crises are inherently threatening and disruptive, their resolution usually 
depends on the balance of forces prevailing before the crisis and this 
often favours the restoration of the status quo. The marginalization of left 
and radical forces, in and after the crisis, only continues a well 
established historical trend which we examine in the next section.  A 
British labour movement that had been in retreat and disarray for three 
decades was hardly likely to be reconstituted as an arbiter of outcomes by 
one moment of crisis. Capitalist democracy is nevertheless robust partly 
because of its capacity for reflexivity as failings are interrogated and 
reformed in the light of interrogation. As we show near the end of the 
chapter, there is now much more of this robust interrogation, notably 
from elite technocrats in the regulatory agencies, like the Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) who are trying to 
reclaim the reform initiative. But what was striking about the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis was the willingness of mainstream politicians from 
all parties (and trade unionists of all persuasions) to substitute the 
scapegoating of individual bad bankers for a credible reform programme.   
 
The puzzle of so little reflexivity in the immediate aftermath of the crisis 
must be related to a more fundamental paradox. Since Reagan and 
Thatcher, social scientists have increasingly preferred  not to talk about 
ideology (or ideologies) as the false knowledge of the bourgeoisie while, 
paradoxically,  capitalism has in this same period taken a narrative turn 
through mystifications which greatly strengthen elite power against 
democratic challenge. ‘Storytelling’ has thus become an important 
weapon in the armoury of economic elites.  The issue of story telling has 
been approached through discussions of performativity but the 
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preoccupation here with the performativity of formal knowledges like 
mainstream economics or finance theory 4 has led to neglect of informal 
stories in political contexts. 
 
The story has been an important device of elite power since the beginning 
of formal mass democracy in Britain around 1918. There is a venerable 
tradition of constitutional mystification about ‘arms length control’ and 
such like which justifies  the unaccountability of elites by implying that 
the delicate functioning of our institutions would only be upset by the 
intrusion of majoritarian democratic forces.5  Political developments after 
1979 gave business narratives a new impetus in economic affairs. If the 
end of British style corporatism under Mrs Thatcher displaced organised 
labour, it also threatened organised business and the traditional trade 
association in a world where the Tory or New Labour default in favour of 
the market did not automatically deliver sector friendly regulation and tax 
regimes.  Big business, especially in finance and pharmaceuticals, 
increased its spend on ‘do it yourself’ lobbying by individual firms.6 This 
was backed up by organising loose distributive coalitions of firms which 
legitimated sectional business demands with stories about their activity’s  
social value. This value was defined pragmatically as delivery of 
whatever the political classes wanted by way of jobs, tax revenue, a green 
or knowledge based economy etc. 7 
 
If Noel Coward celebrated the potency of ‘cheap music’ in Private Lives, 
political and business elites have discovered the potency of cheap stories 
in public life. This potency is considerable because these stories have a 
performative as much as a narrative dimension:  the new economic 
stories, like the old constitutional stories, provide templates for the design 
and redesign of old and new institutions and regulatory regimes. In 
capitalism after the narrative turn, the outcome is not capture but closure. 
The idea of capture is promoted in public choice economics where 
selfish, rent seeking special interests usually win at the expense of an 
indifferent public. As analysts of closure, we envisage a more complex 
and cultural world. Here stories are used to motivate political action and 
inaction but narratives often compete and much is outside the stories, so 
that closure is a kind of temporary special case not an inevitable 
permanent result. From this point of view, politics is then about 
interfering with narratives so as to enforce the limits on performativity.  
 
The new economic mystifications about private equity as a better form of 
ownership or the social value of a large finance sector, like the old 
political mystifications about arms length control, owe very little to 
intentionality or conscious manipulation by elite insiders. While 
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recognising the importance of new financial elites,8 we do not suppose 
that such elites have an executive committee which meets in the 
boardroom at Goldman Sachs to decide the industry line for Davos. 
Cheap stories allow business elites to operate in loose coalitions 
distinguished mainly by an absence of imagination and the ever present 
support of  PR functionaries and lobbyists. Their work on and with stories 
is rather like mass TV advertising with its endless repetition and simple 
updating of the same message in search of a suggestible but amnesiac 
target audience.9 All this is capable of being routinised because the cheap 
story works by selection of evidence and assertive identifications which 
simplify matters in the hope of gaining political intelligibility and 
acceptance. As we saw in the case of big pharma’s story about the 
significance of research and development,10 the point of vulnerability is 
that most industry stories can be unpicked by resourceful critics who do 
not find it difficult to develop better evidenced alternative stories.  The 
‘story’ as a mystifying device is subject to interference, as we shall see in 
the current struggle over banking reform. 
 
 
 
Prehistory of the crisis:  constitutional and economic mystifications 
before 2007  
 
In capitalism after the narrative turn, most stories have a prehistory. This 
is certainly so in the case of finance where, since the late 1980s,  political 
participation and intellectual debate about finance had been narrowed by 
mystification so that finance became a domain of high politics for 
industry leaders,  sympathetic technocrats and supportive elite political 
sponsors. Two mystifications then supplied what Wright Mills called the 
‘vocabulary of motivation’ for elite economic and political practices. One 
mystification varied the venerable pre 1914 narrative about self-
regulation that helped legitimise a particular regulatory order which 
conferred on financial markets the right to run their own affairs. The 
second mystification was a post 1980s narrative about the social and 
economic value of finance in the wider economy. That narrative helped 
politically empower finance as a sector by emphasising the importance of 
an economic regime and a ‘light touch’ regulatory regime both tailored to 
the needs of financial markets.  
 
The regulatory narrative in the decade after the return of Labour to 
government in 1997 was couched in new language about ‘light touch’ 
regulation. The City was viewed by the new Labour government as both a 
tax cash cow, and as an engine of growth, job creation and innovation in 
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the UK economy. But the City was also pictured – and pictured itself – as 
operating in an international climate of ferocious competitiveness in 
which comparative advantage accrued to the financial centre which most 
effectively pursued market friendly regulation. This was the immediate 
origin of the regulatory style practised for a decade by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) between 1997 and 2007, and sponsored by key 
figures in the political and regulatory elite, such as Chancellor Brown and 
successive Governors of the central bank. This mystification presented 
light touch, flexible regulation, involving cooperation with market actors, 
as the most efficient way to manage financial markets.  
 
But that mystification was not just, or even mainly, the creation of New 
Labour’s alliance with business and the City.  It reflected a historically 
deeper system of mystification that was a product of the framing 
peculiarities of British historical development. Britain’s early entry into 
industrialism, preceding as it did the development of any democratic 
political forces, created a politically privileged business elite which 
promoted regulation without the law or public controls. The expression of 
this was in doctrines of self-regulation and cooperative regulation – the 
latter a doctrine that any public regulation should only be conducted with 
the cooperation of regulated enterprises.11 The doctrine was peculiarly 
well embedded in financial markets, dominated as they were by the 
oldest, most entrenched of business elites. The doctrine of self-regulation 
in financial markets survived the rise of the labour movement, the 
appearance of formal democracy after World War I, and the rise of an 
interventionist state. Indeed, it had to survive these developments, for its 
mystifying purpose was, by representing regulation as a matter of flexible 
control by market actors with practical experience, to keep at a distance 
the threat of controls by any of the forces potentially empowered by 
democratic politics.   
 
The mystification of self-regulation proved hard to sustain in the age of 
globalised markets, financial innovation and the new business models that 
developed from the 1980s onwards.12  But in Britain, nevertheless, it did 
survive through tortuous processes. For instance the regulatory regime 
instituted under the Financial Services Act 1986 –  designed to regulate 
the markets after the UK’s ‘big bang’ – created a labyrinthine 
institutional world of self-regulatory organisations (SROs) presided over 
by a Securities and Investments Board which had a hybrid, ambiguous 
constitutional status.13 This, along with the Bank of England’s own ‘light 
touch’ regulation of the banking system, was swept away in the 1997 
reforms that created the FSA – reforms that were the product of the 
massive failure of light touch regulation to foresee and forestall the crash 
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of the House of Barings in 1995.14  The creation of the FSA represented 
an inching towards a more formal, publicly controlled, system; but, as we 
now know, its practice involved total capitulation to the rhetoric of light 
touch, market friendly controls.15 
 
Why was so much invested in the reinvention of an old regulatory style 
for a new order? If it was explicitly designed to enhance London’s 
competitive advantage, why was it so important to have a globally 
leading financial centre?  One answer lies in the bureaucratic politics of 
international financial diplomacy. By the 1980s the UK was a declining 
military and diplomatic power with a palsied manufacturing sector.  But 
its financial regulators punched above their weight in the networks of 
international financial regulators: the Bank of England, for instance, 
regularly provided the chairs (including the founding chair) of the key 
Basel committees concerned with banking regulation. And they punched 
above their weight because London was a financial centre of an 
importance well beyond the scale of the wider UK economy.  Possessing 
a leading global financial centre was thus the equivalent, in international 
financial regulatory politics, of a permanent seat on the security council 
or possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.  
 
But there was also a new supporting economic narrative about the social 
value of finance which. from the 1980s onwards, legitimised the objective 
of  strengthening London’s comparative advantage. In this narrative, 
finance became the goose that laid the golden egg, so that what was good 
for the global financial centre in London was also good for the UK 
economy. The old constitutional mystifications that legitimised market 
friendly regulation did have some (contestable) evidential foundations 
because it could be argued that regulatory systems more based on the law 
and adversarial regulation, like the US, were also prone to regulatory 
failure.  But the new narrative about the social value of finance to the 
wider economy was more or less pure fantasy. Crucially, through 15 
years of finance led boom from the early 1990s the finance sector never 
employed more than one million workers directly; demand from finance 
maybe employed another half million indirectly out of sector though 
numbers employed did not increase as finance sector output grew and 
profits  boomed.16  These profits were disproportionately captured by 
foreign owned investment banks and financial services conglomerates. 
By the time New Labour came to power in 1997 the City had become a 
global bazaar with domestically owned concerns taken over by the largest 
globally organised institutions, which treated the City as one arena of 
their trading system and recruited a cosmopolitan workforce.   
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The new mystification exerted a powerful hold over the minds of  
participants in financial markets, financial regulators and economic 
policy makers by the 1990s.  It did this in part because it was promoted 
by the heft of a powerful lobbying and PR machine. But, more 
fundamentally it was potent because it was consonant with the new 
economic rhetoric about enterprise and rewards which was part of the 
post Thatcher settlement. Moreover it was powerful because it recreated 
an old political pattern of alliance amongst metropolitan elites which was 
part of their historic lineage.  
 
The decline of the industrial spirit in metropolitan England in the later 
19th century led to a fusion of metropolitan political, administrative and 
financial elites which was memorably described at the start of the 20th 
century by Hobson in Imperialism.17  In this process, financial  
occupations experienced collective upward mobility. For much of the 19th 
century, the stock jobbers’ trade was in the same twilight moral world as 
that of the bookie; by the end, stock jobbing became a respectable 
occupation for public schoolboys -   the first old Etonian jobber dates 
from 1891.18  Marital and business alliances connected financial, 
aristocratic and political elites.19 The growth of financial markets after 
Big Bang, especially with the rise of proprietary trading in the 1990s,  led 
to the emergence of new and more numerous financial elites who claimed 
meritocratic provenance and whose world was European or global as 
much as national. But the political representatives of the new elites were 
incorporated into a national reworking of the old style British alliance of 
the post industrial elites.  
 
Thus, the narrative about the social value of finance in the years leading 
up to the crash of 2007-8 was potent because it served to align the 
calculations of different elites (in markets, the core executive and the 
regulatory agencies) about the benefits of financial innovation; and 
because it was congruent with the historically engrained culture of 
consensus amongst (old and new) metropolitan elites who were once 
again in the saddle during the years of Thatcherite triumphalism.  
Thatcher’s control of the state, recall, rested on the way the electoral 
system gave power to a party supported by only a minority of votes 
concentrated in the metropolitan south east – in the very England 
sketched so memorably by Hobson almost a century earlier.  
 
Business as usual: mystification and reform up to summer 2010  
 
The power of mystifying narrative was demonstrated in the wasted year 
between the downfall of Lehman and the summer of 2009, when popular 
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hostility to bankers was strong but the impetus for banking reform was 
deflected and dissipated. The interim result was a timid British 
government White Paper on financial reform published in July 2009 
which promised to change very little; and a Banking Act which in April 
2010 enacted more or less exactly the timid original proposals.20 All this 
becomes intelligible if we consider how financial and allied elites quickly 
recovered from the traumas of 2007-8 by closing ranks and recycling the 
old mystifying narratives. The old constitutional mystifications and the 
shareholder value trope were together deployed to ensure it was to be 
business as usual in newly nationalised banks. Meanwhile, the newer 
story about the social value of finance was deployed to deflect demands 
for radical structural reform, such as breaking up banks that were ‘too big 
to fail.’  
 
Extreme intervention to prop up the banking system resulted in faute de 
mieux nationalisation of banks like Northern Rock and Royal Bank of 
Scotland, which passed into public ownership; just as the state also 
acquired a substantial minority stake in Lloyds. Public ownership is not 
of course democratic control, but it did represent a democratic threat to 
elite power. A major part of the banking system was now state owned and 
controlled so that elected politicians could, in principle, always ask what 
state owned banks were doing and instruct them to do something different 
by way of lending or pay. At this point the fusion and interpenetration of 
elites became important. The challenge of democracy was headed off by a 
few key figures at the Treasury, notably the civil servant John Kingman 
(who has since left to work for Rothchild) and Paul Myners the ex fund 
manager who had been brought in by Labour as a junior Treasury 
minister. Their institutional creation was United Kingdom Financial 
Investments (UKFI) a new holding company for government majority 
and minority stakes in banks, where City grandees in the chairman role 
worked alongside Kingman as chief executive.   
 
But this kind of social defence by closing elite ranks requires a narrative 
justification to motivate anti democratic practice, In the case of UKFI, 
this was provided by combining an old constitutional mystification with 
newer tropes about shareholder value. Kingman repeatedly insisted that 
UKFI operated at ‘arms’ length’ from government.21 The new agency was 
thereby inserted into an old pattern of institutional arrangements between 
agencies and the democratic state in Britain. As Flinders’ recent study 
shows, the doctrine of the ‘arm’s length’ relationship has been a central 
feature of constitutional rhetoric in Britain and a key device to insulate 
the workings of agencies with delegated functions from the accountability 
pressures of the democratic state.22  
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This was backed up by invoking the tropes of shareholder value and 
constructing the citizen/ taxpayer as a shareholder in failed banks which 
should be first managed, and then sold off, in a way that maximised 
shareholder value. UKFI’s  Framework Document of March 2009  
insisted on the one ‘overarching objective of protecting and creating 
value for the taxpayer as shareholder’. 23 Within this discursive frame 
UKFI acquired the identity of an engaged, responsible, large institutional 
investor whose relations with state owned bank managements were 
formally subordinated to familiar private sector investment objectives. 
Democratic interference with day by day management decisions or 
second guessing of business strategy then became unthinkable; just as 
high pay, for example, remained justifiable if linked with ‘performance’ 
as defined inside the shareholder value model. As UKFI elaborated its 
role and mandate, it increasingly represented, not the nationalisation of 
the banks, but the privatisation of the Treasury as a new kind of fund 
manager. 
 
Demands for more broad based structural reform of (non nationalised) 
banks and markets were then deflected by updating the old narrative 
about the social value of finance in the Bischoff and Wigley reports.24  
These reports arose out of the pre crisis high politics of financial lobbying 
and were ostensibly about the competitiveness of London as an 
international financial centre (not about the causes of crisis or the solution 
of re-regulation). They nevertheless represented a striking intervention 
against reform by financial elites in the first year after the crisis 
 
Sociologically, the reports represent more fusion of the metropolitan 
elites and the deliberate exclusion of other voices, so that finance could 
report on finance. The first report was co-chaired by Win Bischoff, 
former chairman of Citigroup, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 
second report was commissioned by the Mayor of London from a group 
headed by Bob Wigley, European chair of Merrill Lynch. In their 
working methods Bischoff and Wigley provide a stark contrast with those 
of earlier generations of reports on the City, such as the Macmillan 
Committee of 1931, the Radcliffe Committee of 1959 and the Wilson 
Committee of 1980.  These inquiries, for all their biases, included in their 
memberships prominent critics of the City, and gathered evidence 
likewise from sceptics. By contrast in the cases of Bischoff and of 
Wigley, non City groups were not included or consulted in the 
information gathering, problem defining phase or subsequently in the 
drafting of the two reports about the benefits of finance. There was no 
speaking part for non-financial businesses and their trade associations, or 
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for trade unions despite the unionisation of retail finance workers, or for 
NGOs representing consumers or pressing social justice agendas, or for 
mainstream economists or heterodox intellectuals.25    
 
Again, the social combination of financial and political elites worked 
through narrative framing. Both the Bischof and Wigley reports act out a 
kind of discursive two step: in a first step, the reports updated the pre 
2007 lobbyist’s story by adding the many contributions of financial 
services to the national economy; and then in a second step, the reports 
identified the conditions necessary to maintain this socially valuable 
activity which incidentally included something like the regulatory status 
quo. The intellectual substance behind this story was meagre. It consisted, 
for example, of adding benefits but not subtracting any offsetting costs of 
finance. Thus Bischof added up taxes paid and collected by finance 
without considering the costs of bailing out the financial system.26 But 
these stories were good enough to secure political buy in and copy out by 
Treasury politicians and civil servants who retained the dominant role in 
directing reform. 
 
First, leading politicians explicitly bought into the syllogism about the 
social value of finance and made a commitment to nurture the sector. 
Thus, in his foreword to the Bischoff Report, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer writes that ‘financial services are critical to the UK’s future’27 
(Bischoff, p.2). In a press release accompanying the Wigley Report, the 
Mayor of London said: ‘Bob’s team have identified what needs to be 
done and I will pull out all the stops to protect London’s position as the 
world’s premier financial centre’.28 
 
Second, the claims about the social value of finance from the Bischoff 
Report are copied out and used as a framing device in other official 
reports, especially the July 2009 White Paper on Reforming Financial 
Markets. In its first chapter, the White Paper begins by reviewing not the 
causes of crisis but ‘the importance of financial services and markets to 
the UK Economy and the pre-eminence of the UK as a global financial 
centre’.29  Claims and evidence from Bischoff are simply copied out and 
dropped into the text of the White Paper, which reproduces the story and 
unsurprisingly ends by proposing nothing radical. 
 
City elites went for closure in the Bischof and Wigley reports and 
immediately got what they wanted in the White Paper of July 2009 whose 
title reference to ‘reform’ did not describe the contents of the report. The 
White Paper made no proposals for reforming industry structure by, for 
example, breaking up large complex financial conglomerates or 
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segregating proprietary trading activities. Even the architecture of 
regulation was to be only changed marginally: the FSA would continue 
with the addition of a Financial Stability Committee dominated by 
regulatory insiders. All this is faithfully enacted in the 2010 Banking Act,  
which demonstrates the power of stories in shaping outcomes to the 
crisis.  But, as we also emphasised, political stories have performative 
limits and seldom close things down definitively.  So it was with UK 
financial reform in the aftermath of the crisis. With democracy sidelined, 
the resistance to doing nothing was led by technocrats who re-formed as a 
kind of dissident elite section operating independently of populist 
politicians often more concerned with electoral advantage than with 
making banking safe. 
 
Technocratic elites: editing themselves back into the script 
 
If the twentieth century had reinvented capitalism as rule of experts, the 
first major crisis of the twenty first century was profoundly threatening 
for the technocrats in the regulatory agencies – the FSA and the Bank of 
England – who had dominated financial matters in the era of the Great 
Moderation. The crash destroyed much of their intellectual capital. The 
politicians were forced to improvise intervention in the vortex of the 
crisis. Then the City and its Treasury allies hijacked rescue management 
and financial reform. But, from summer 2009, the technocratic elite 
responded to this challenge by forcibly reopening the argument about the 
regulation of finance which had apparently been closed down. In the next 
phase, the technocrats took the leading role in trouble making but have, 
crucially, failed to form an alliance with senior politicians and democratic 
forces.   
 
The most important source of technocratic dissent has predictably been 
the Bank of England which is neither hostage to the City nor an 
institution of practical men, as originally envisaged by Montagu Norman. 
The Bank’s relative autonomy from City interests is culturally shaped by 
a group of technocrats like Governor King and his financial stability 
director, Andrew Haldane, whose intellectual capital comes from 
academic economics rather than market experience. From summer 2009, 
their dissent was actively backed up by Adair Turner as chair of the FSA 
who represented not institutional culture but self assurance. Turner is a 
well networked fixer who parlayed a first career with McKinsey into a 
series of elite posts, and after the crisis quickly wrote his own FSA report 
on what went wrong with the financial system.30    
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Papers and speeches by senior Bank of England officials are never the 
result of individual reflection; they are the result of continuing internal 
debate within a small group of elite technocrats.  In 2009, a series of 
related papers by Andrew Haldane and speeches by Mervyn King 
together  mounted a radical critique of pre 2007 policies and the 
subsequent piecemeal reform. These critiqued argues that: the benefits of 
financial innovation had been greatly exaggerated; the UK economy was 
distorted and over dependent on a large financial sector and the City; 
structural reforms were needed to segregate retail banking from banking 
that rested on proprietary trading, and probably to dismantle ‘banking on 
the state’, where serious moral hazard problems were created by banks 
that were ‘too big to fail’31 in a system that was guaranteed by the 
taxpayer. This was ably backed up by Adair Turner who combined fluent 
McKinsey style industry analysis of banking with headline catching 
phrases about ‘socially useless’ finance. 
 
If all this was brave and independent, it also represented a narrowing of 
the technocratic imagination. Andrew Haldane is not J M Keynes or 
William Beveridge because he has no discernible politics beyond hostility 
to socialisation of private banking losses and his world view is marked bv 
a naïve scientism. Consider, for example, Haldane’s major attempt to 
rebuild technocratic capital by ‘rethinking the financial network’ in ways 
which would give the technocrats a new role in explaining the financial 
crisis and making the world safe. He boldly proposed a paradigm shift 
into epidemiology and ecology as ways of relating financial crisis to other 
kinds of system failure and disaster.32 This gambit is intellectually radical 
because it focuses potential solutions on whole system mapping and 
reconstruction; but it is also politically ambiguous because Haldane’s 
gambit would insulate expert led banking reform from democratic 
politics, and do this before the experts have developed a workable new 
practice of macro prudential regulation.   
 
If we consider these technocrats as a group, they are a break away elite 
splinter whose radicalism is driven by their disruptive commitment to 
evidence (which had never figured much in other, earlier stories about the 
economic and social value of finance). The elite technocrats’ currency of 
debate is – in a way that Montagu Norman would have found 
incomprehensible – systematically assembled economic data.  It is their 
shared commitment to economic arithmetic (rather than a specific 
theoretical problematic or algebraic methods) which ties them together. 
Thus Haldane has produced elegant, forensic analysis of how the banks 
trashed return on assets so as to maintain return on equity which kept the 
stock market happy.33 Just as Turner, in his Cass lecture, took the long 
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view of changes in bank lending and bank balance sheets which led them 
far from intermediation.34 But their faith in numbers has not so far re-
energised the (national) reform process because the technocrats are 
bureacratically divided and not acting in alliance with senior politicians 
and massed democratic political forces.  
 
Bureaucratic politics is a primitive force which divides Bank and FSA 
technocrats who happily cite each others papers.  In the original reforms 
that created the now discredited system in 1997, the Bank was the big 
loser when it was obliged to surrender its jurisdiction over bank 
supervision to the newly created FSA. The post 2007 Bank agenda for 
reform now offers the possibility of reclaiming some of that lost ‘turf’ at 
the expense of the FSA. The Financial Services Authority was the 
kingpin of the regulatory system after 1997. It suffered correspondingly 
from the crisis which discredited light touch regulation and has since tried 
to reinvent as a more adversarial, intrusive regulator.35 The 2009 White 
Paper and the 2010 Banking Act disappointed many but they were, from 
the point of view of the FSA, a highly effective damage limitation 
exercise because the reputationally damaged FSA would remain the 
kingpin of regulation (until Labour lost the election).  
 
Apart from bureaucratic internal divisions, the British technocrats are 
weakened by the absence of any high level alliances with politicians who 
hold power and can mobilise democratic forces for change. In this 
respect, the British technocrats are in a very different place from their 
counterparts in the USA where the technocrat Tim Geithner has become 
Treasury Secretary and stands alongside President Obama in pressing the 
case for radical structural reform against Republicans and the finance 
lobbyists.  
 
The British disconnect between technocracy and politics is manifest in 
many ways. In the adversarial politics of a general election, it was the 
third and smallest British party which, under the influence of one man 
(Vince Cable) advocated the structural reform of breaking up the banks. 
Labour offered continuity: its manifesto commended the marginal 
reshaping of the regulatory system in the White Paper and the Banking 
Act, and even repeated, virtually verbatim, the UKFI commitment to sell 
off the public holdings in banks at a price that would maximise return to 
the taxpayer. The Conservative Party put its trust in the wisdom of new 
regulators by proposing to abolish the FSA and transfer jurisdiction over 
banking regulation to the Bank. If we consider not manifesto programmes 
but policy initiatives, the two largest British parties both tend to default 
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onto populist banker bashing as substitute for banking reform as, 
classically, with Chancellor Darling’s one off tax on bank bonuses. 
 
This part of our story has no conclusion, and not only because our chapter 
is delivered before the outcome of the 2010 General Election. 
Inconclusiveness reflects something deeper: the chronic instability of a 
capitalist system which runs on mystifying narratives of finance and 
much else in a wider society marked by intellectual, bureaucratic and 
electoral competition. In this sense, the importance of ideology is 
reasserted while, at the same time, we see the limits of performativity.  
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We are grateful to the editors for comments on an earlier draft. 
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